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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK H. PITTS and
SANDRA J. PITTS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No. 15010

KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and
CRAIG McLACHLAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appellants make this Petition for Rehearing for the
r~son

that fundamental errors were committed by the Court,

both in arriving at its decision and in the preparation of
its opinion.
In the third paragraph of the opinion, in referring
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract of October 7, 1975, the
opinion states:
"It was the type of contract that may be treated
as a mortgage at the option of the seller, when
and if the buyer defaults in its terms. The
plaintiffs chose that procedure and foreclosed
against the McLachlans * * *."
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The contract is unusual, in that it provides for a
small down payment, then for a payment of $2,000 the next
month, then for two monthly payments of $210, and then for
payment of the entire balance of $31,333.57 on the next month
or January 8, 1976 (R. 4).

It is true that Paragraph 16 of

the contract provides the sellers with three options, namely
to seek to forfeit the contract as liquidated damages under
Option A, to sue for the delinquent installments under Option
B, or to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable,
treat the contract as a note and mortgage and pass title to
the buyer subject thereto under Option C.
The plaintiffs clearly elected to sue under Option!
and brought action for the payment due January 8, 1976,

pl~

taxes, interest and attorneys' fees, after giving credit for
the previous installments paid.

(It will be noted that ilie

contract erroneously uses the balance of $31,333.57 as the
approximate amount of the installment due on or before
January 8, 1976, failing to deduct, in the recitations of
the contract, the payment of $2,000 due on October 28, 1975.1
(Amended Complaint, R. 9, ,, 4)

There is not one word in the

Complaint (R. 2 and 3) or the Amended Complaint (R. 9 and 1~1
about treating the contract as a mortgage and bringing actio:
to foreclose.
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The Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 13-14) states the
basis of the judgment to be obtained and refers to it as:
"The due date of the payment of the balance
owing is plain from the contract and from
the affidavit** *."
The affidavit offered as the basis for the summary judgment
likewise simply refers to the payments made as required by the
contract, recognizes the $2,000 which was paid on December 15
rnstead of October 28, 1975, and calculates the balance of the
balloon payment due January 8, 1976 to be $29,333.57.

Again,

there is no statement referring to the passage of title or the
foreclosure of a mortgage.

(R. 15)

This error of the Court in considering this to be an
action where the sellers passed title and sought to foreclose
as a mortgage is fundamental, because the case deals with the
matter of where title stood and in whose name.

The defendants-

respondents took the position that title passed to the buyers
jointly and equally simply by the entry of the judgment.

That

is the basis of the action filed by the creditors of Craig
McLachlan.

Appellants sought correction of the summary judgment,

not for the purpose of undoing the passage of title effectuated
by a mortgage foreclosure election, but to clarify the situation

and to eliminate the question of whether title passed in a
~nner

contrary to the recitations of the contract itself.
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-4Appellants did not and do not concede that title passt
and cited authorities that this issue must be determined favort
to passage of title in a proceeding designed to that specific
objective.

Houston Oil Co. v. Randolph, 251

s.w.

794, 28 A.L.i

926 (Tex. 1923), (cited at page 15 of appellant's Brief);
Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207, 159 A.L.R, 852;
and 4 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, 11 39 0 and 39 3 (cited at pages 4
and 5 of appellant's Reply Brief).
In that same third paragraph of the opinion, the Court
makes another mistaken assumption in the last sentence of that
paragraph, where i t states:
0

The property then appeared as of record in
the names of Kimberly B. and Craig McLachlan
(as evidenced later in the Sheriff's documents
at execution sale) . "
The execution directs the Sheriff to sell:
0
* * * the unexempted real property of the
defendants in accordance with the praecipe
attached hereto."
(R. 29)

And i t will be noted that there is no praecipe attached to the
execution and the praecipe was not included in the record,
presumably because delivered only to the Sheriff.
Then the Sheriff's return recites that he has:
0
* * * attached and levied upon all the right,
title claim and interest of Kimberly B. McLachlan
and C;aig McLachlan, defendants, or either of them,
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-sof, in and to the following described real estate
standing on the records of Salt Lake County in
the name of Kimberly B. McLachlan and Craig
McLachlan * * * [describing the property involved]."
This is not a recital that any property stands in the name of
the McLachlans or either of them and the same return on the
execution recites that there is to be sold the property described,

"* * * together with the rights of the vendor
in the garage and right of way in the rear or
to the north of said premises."

thus indicating that the description was not taken from the
County records where the Sellers would have been grantors and
not vendors.

The Sheriff simply used his printed form and

proceeded to sell any interest of the McLachlans under a
contract and based on a judgment obtained on that contract.
These two erroneous assumptions made by the Court are
fundamental in this case.

The Court assumes that title passed

to Kimberly B. and Craig McLachlan by reason of election to foreclpse and to pass title to somebody, and the Court finds two
names on the Sheriff's return of execution and concludes that
title was passed to Kimberly and Craig McLachlan.

Appellants

had sought to raise before this court the issue of the right to
correct a summary judgment so as to avoid litigation over the
question of whether title passed and to whom.

Because of the
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-6Court's assumptions, the Court did not consider the case in its
proper light, namely,
"Must it now be determined whether title
passed, or can the appellants correct the
summary judgment in order to avoid litigation
for determination of where title reposes and
to what extent?"
The Court's opinion treats the matter as though plaintiffs
made a mistake in the beginning in electing to pass title
foreclose as though it were a mortgage.

~d

This was not the case

and not the election and the Court should re-examine its entire
opinion for the effect these mistaken assumptions make in the
analysis of the entire position of appellants.

Admittedly, the Court could still find that the Distric
Court correctly denied the motion; but before doing that, the
Court should appraise the case as it actually arose and with no
passage of title except as that might be involved by reason
of the entry of a judgment for the balance due.

Whether title

passec;l and to whom is not before the Court in this action for
adjudication.

Appellants simply state the possibility ~at

title passed and to somebody and ask the Court to eliminate
that question for the reasons cited in the Brief and referred
to in the Court's opinion, reflecting appellant's position
that there are involved, in addition to-inadvertence,

~e
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givin!

-7of additional time to the respondents to perform the contract,
avoiding a windfall to defendants and their judgment creditors
at the expense of plaintiffs, avoiding a multiplicity of actions,
and giving performance of the contract in the manner contemplated
by the parties in which Kimberly McLachlan was the buyer and
craig McLachlan was the co-signer or guarantor.
Appellants submit that the Court should grant a rehearing in this matter so that reconsideration of the entire
matter may be had by the Court, with no assumptions as to the
passage of title, but title to be considered only in light of
the uncertainty that exists as to passage of title where vendors
bring an action for the past due installment of a contract,
which in this case happens to be the balloon payment at the end
of the contract.

~e7!1311ytJ submi ~!

nn

~r£~.

RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. of
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Petition for Rehearing was served
on the Respondents this 8th day of August, 1977, by mailing
true and correct copies thereof, postage prepaid, to David M.
Bown and Stephen R. McCaughey, attorneys for Respondents,
321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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